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In this paper we explore how incentives to acquire education are inﬂuenced by the
variability in the rate of return to human capital in the context of migration.1 Specif-
ically, we show that if migration is a possibility, such variability in the rate of return
to human capital can induce residents of developing countries to make greater invest-
ments in education. Moreover, providing that education is relatively costly, variability
in the rate of return to human capital may increase the average level of education in
a developing economy even once expected migration is netted out. In addition, our
ﬁndings are shown to have explanatory power in relation to education and migratory
patterns of minorities.
The starting point of our analysis is that developing countries tend to be more
unstable than developed countries. As Lucas (1988: 4) points out, ”the rich countries
show little diversity [variability], ... [while] within the poorest countries ... there is
enormous variability ... Within the advanced countries, growth rates tend to be very
stable over long periods of time ... For poorer countries, however, there are many
examples of sudden, large changes in growth rates, both up and down”. Such obser-
vations have recently received substantial empirical support. For example, Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997) found a clear decreasing relation between output volatility and
initial output per capita, and argued that this could account at least partly for the lack
of convergence observed at the international level. The causes of instability in LDCs
may be economic in nature - the result, perhaps, of an economy that is non-diversiﬁed
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997), or political, due, for example, to political unrest, civil
war, social conﬂicts, or inadequate economic policies (Alesina et al., 1996, Elbadawi
and Schmidt, 1998). Income variability is also associated with lower growth rates, as
documented by Barro and Lee (1993), Ramey and Ramey (1995), or Elbadawi and
Schmidt (1998). For example, Ramey and Ramey (1995) found such negative rela-
tionships for both developed and developing countries. Among a series of candidate
explanatory variables, they selected volatility in innovation and public spending as
clearly associated with lower growth rates, but rejected the investment-based hypoth-
esis, according to which instability would tend to be detrimental to growth because
it discourages investments in physical capital. This surprising result, however, may
be due to their use of gross investment rates. Indeed, using disaggregated data for
a large set of developing countries, Aizenman and Marion (1999) reported a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant negative correlation between various volatility measures and private
investment, while public investment was shown to be positively correlated with some
measures of volatility.2
The impact of instability on private investments in human capital would seem to be
1Throughout the text, education and human capital are used synonymously. Besides, since the
only source of income in our model is human capital, income variability and rate of return variability
are equivalent.
2Aizenman and Marion (1999) used as explanatory variables the volatilities in government spend-
ings, money growth, and real exchange rate. All three variables were found to be negatively correlated
to private investment, while the ﬁrst two variables were positively correlated to public investment.
2less clear-cut. The only empirical evidence we are aware of is brought up by Flug et al.
(1998), who tested the impact of income and employment volatilities, ﬁnancial market
imperfections, and income inequality, on enrollment rates in secondary education.
Using both cross section and panel data analysis for about one hundred countries over
the period 1970-92, they found the following results. While the impact of the last
two variables (ﬁnancial underdevelopment and income inequality) is clearly negative
for any speciﬁcation, when spliting the sample between low-income and high-income
countries, employment volatility appeared to have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in low-
income countries but a positive and non-signiﬁcant eﬀect in high-income countries,
and income volatility appeared to have a non-signiﬁcant eﬀe c ti nb o t hl o wa n dh i g h -
income countries.
From a theoretical viewpoint, these somewhat ambiguous eﬀects of economic
volatility on human capital accumulation are not so surprising. On the one hand,
indeed, human capital is probably more risky than physical capital since it cannot
be bought or sold and cannot be separated from its owner. The possibilities for di-
versiﬁcation are therefore very limited in the case of human capital, making human
capital decisions very sensitive to risk levels (Levhari and Weiss, 1974).3 This is
particularly compelling in developing countries, where pervasive capital markets im-
perfections, combined with lack of international ﬁnancial integration, make it very
diﬃcult to hedge against human capital risks (Baxter and Jermann, 1997).4 But on
the other hand, it has long been recognized that instability can induce higher lev-
els of investment in education in two ways. First, education may increase people
ability to hedge against uncertainty and reduce such uncertainty by better analyzing
information. Second, owners of human capital have access to extended occupational
o p p o r t u n i t i e s ;a sar e s u l t ,e d u c a t i o ni si m p a r t e dw i t ha no p t i o nv a l u ew h i c hi n c r e a s e s ,
as is well known, with the variability of the underlying asset (Weisbrod, 1962, Comay
et al., 1973). Both eﬀects would seem to be particularly signiﬁcant within the context
of migration. Schultz (1980, p. 646), suggests that when alternative migration oppor-
tunities arise, “additional human capital ..... is valuable to better job opportunities
and to better locations in which to live”. Moreover, as a result of the increasingly
selective immigration policies that tend to favor educated individuals, education has
become a passport to emigration. Combined with traditional self-selection eﬀects,
this explains the overall tendency of migration rates to be much higher for relatively
highly educated individuals (Carrington and Detragiache, 1999).
Income variability has also been viewed as an important issue in the migration
literature. It is well known that both mean income and income variance impinge on
migration decisions. For example, when the market does not allow for a trade-oﬀ
between a lower mean and reduced variance, risk averse individuals would choose to
3Levhari and Weiss (1974) also recognize that “From the social point of view, this needs not
be the case since compared with physical capital, human capital is quite ﬂexible in its uses under
varying economic circumstances.”
4In related work, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) found that increased ﬁnancial integration induces
increased specialization, thereby rendering macroeconomic ﬂuctuations less symmetric across coun-
tries.
3migrate even if the mean incomes at origin and destination are the same, provided
that income variability at destination and migration costs are suﬃciently low. This
literature has focused mainly on models with risk-averse individuals (Katz and Stark,
1986), or migration as part of a familial strategy of risk diversiﬁcation (Stark, 1991,
Taylor and Wyatt, 1996, Chen and Chiang, 1998). In both cases, however, this liter-
ature has generally ignored any direct connections between education and migration
decisions.
At the same time, several recent studies focused on the eﬀects of migration prospects
on human capital accumulation (Mountford, 1997, Stark et al., 1998, Vidal, 1998, and
Beine et al., 2001), suggesting that migration prospects may foster human capital for-
mation and growth in the source country of migrants.5 To generate this result, these
studies assume that there are inter-country wage diﬀerentials. The essence of the
argument is that if the foreign return to education is high, some individuals would
buy education in the hope of migrating and beneﬁting from this high return. How-
ever, uncertainty prevails since some individuals may ﬁnally choose not to migrate for
personal (e.g., familial) reasons, or may not be accepted by immigration authorities
in destination countries. In such a context, the overall eﬀect of migration on human
capital formation in the source country may well be positive. This occurs, for a given
wage diﬀerential, when migration probabilities are not too high (so as to preserve the
nation’s stock of human capital) but high enough to allow for a substantial incentive
eﬀect.
In contrast to these two bodies of literature, we assume the mean return to human
capital to be equal at the origin and destination, and focus on the eﬀects of instability
(or income variability) on education and migration decisions made by risk-neutral
individuals. Within our model education is a means of enabling individuals to access
migration opportunities. Conversely, such migration opportunities impart education
with an option value.6 For example, if education opens doors to other countries,
education may provide individuals with a put option, whereby they can avoid low
income realizations in their home country. Using this perspective, we suggest that new
economic insight may be obtained by considering education and migration decisions
against a background of income variability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our basic
model, in which we consider one developing and one developed economy. As explained
above, developing countries tend to exhibit higher levels of macroeconomic instability.
Therefore, the developing country in our model is assumed to show a variable rate
of return to human capital, while in the developed country it is assumed to be ﬁxed.
We focus on education and migration decisions made by risk-neutral individuals in
their ﬁrst and second periods of life, respectively. The individual invests in education
without knowing its domestic rate of return. After the domestic rate of return is
5Most papers use an OLG framework in the spirit of Galor and Tsiddon (1997). Using a slightly
diﬀerent perspective, Stark et al. (1997) also elaborate on the possibility of a brain gain with a brain
drain.
6It has also been argued that migration itself has an option value (Burda, 1995).
4known, he or she decides, based on this realization, whether tom i g r a t e . W es h o w
that the expected level of education may rise or fall in response to a greater rate
of return variability. We ﬁnd that the net eﬀect depends on the cost of education.
If this is high, the main reason for acquiring education would be its option value.
In this case, the expected post-migration level of education is increased. However,
if education costs are low, the opposite holds. In Section 3, the model is extended
to allow for intergroup diﬀerences in income variability, with special reference to
ethnic and religious minorities. Indeed, such groups often represent a substantial
proportion of the immigrants from developing countries, and, in spite of the fact
that they may face discrimination in the access to public education, their members
are frequently better educated than the members of the dominant group. This has
previously been explained in the human capital literature by considering education
(and, obviously, migration) as means of avoiding labor-market discrimination. We
propose a complementary explanation, based on the higher (macro-generated) income
volatility faced by minority groups as a result of discrimination policies and ethnic
tensions, which tend to be exacerbated in bad economic times. We brieﬂyr e v i e wt h e
evidence on this issue, justify why minority groups face higher income variability, and
show how our framework generates the results that minority members may be better
educated and apparently less patriotic than members of the majority group (i.e.,
migrate in higher proportion at given ability levels). Section 4 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2. The Model
Consider a small open developing economy A consisting of a continuum of individuals,
each of whom lives two periods. Without loss of generality, the number of individuals
in A is normalized to unity. At birth, each individual is assigned an ability endowment
a, where a is an independent drawing of a random variable distributed on [0,1] with
ad e n s i t yf u n c t i o ng(a). Individuals receive no ﬁnancial endowments but can borrow
during the ﬁrst period and return the loan during the second period of their life.
The rate of interest is zero and capital markets are perfect.7 All individuals are
risk-neutral, their time discount rate is zero, and their utility is proportional to their
consumption. Information is complete.8
In his ﬁrst period of life, each individual is oﬀered one indivisible unit of education
at a constant positive cost α, the maximal value of which is normalized to unity:
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This investment in human capital is the only investment outlet available,
so that the individual’s ﬁrst-period consumption is either 0 or −α. The individual’s
human capital is then given by ae, where e =0if the individual does not acquire
7Of course, this assumption is not realistic. It is well known that capital markets in LDCs are
imperfect, and that such imperfections impinge on education decisions. We neglect these aspects,
that are central in the literature on inequality and growth (Galor and Zeira, 1993), and focus on
other determinants of the education decision.
8On migration under asymmetric information, see Katz and Stark (1987 and 1989).
5any education, and e =1if the individual acquires the unit of education oﬀered. In
keeping with the literature in this area we assume that human capital is measured
in eﬃciency units and is perfectly transferable between locations. The individual’s
second-period income is given by wae, where w (w>0) is the return to human
capital in the location in which the individual resides in period two. An individual
may either stay in the home country A or migrate to a large developed economy, B.9
Since the second-period income of an uneducated individual is zero in either location,
only educated individuals can migrate.
The return to human capital in B equals 1. However, as well recognized in the
migration literature, individuals generally prefer living in their home country. Thus,
each individual’s valuation of a dollar of consumption in B is discounted to k, where
k is an independent drawing of a random variable distributed on [0,1] with a density
function h(k), and a and k are independently distributed. Thus, each individual is
characterized by and knows the values of two parameters - his ability level, a,a n dh i s
valuation of consumption abroad, k.
As extensively discussed above, developing economies tend to be more unstable
than developed economies. To reﬂect this, we assume w, the return to human capital
in A, to be variable. Note that the no-education income is implicitly ﬁxed at zero
whatever the state of the economy. This should not be interpreted, however, as
meaning that acquiring education makes one’s life riskier.10 Rather, it follows from
the above discussions that if the set of possible occupations for the non-educated is
characterized by relatively high risks, as seems to be the case, e.g., in agriculture,
this would provide further incentives to acquire education. The same option-value
argument that we put forward in the context of inter-country migration could well
be applied to intersectoral mobility within one country. Making the no-education
income invariable, therefore, simply allows us to focus on inter-country diﬀerences in
the volatility of the return to human capital.
With these understandings, we assume the value of w, which is revealed after
the individual makes the education decision but before the migration decision, to be
1+γ²,w h e r eγ is a positive constant, and ² is a random economy-wide variable with
ad e n s i t yf u n c t i o nf(²) deﬁned on [−1,1].N o t et h a tw is assumed to be unaﬀected by
migration.11 In order to enable us to focus on the eﬀects of variability in the return to
education in A,w ea s s u m et h a tt h emean return to education in A equals the return
in B : E(²)=0⇒ E(w)=1 . Also, the variance of ², E(²2) is assumed to be a
constant and equal to σ2 so that the variance of the return to education in A is γ2σ2.
9We do not consider restrictions on labor mobility. Djajic (1989) analyzes the eﬀects of quanti-
tative and qualitative restrictions on the volume and skill composition of migration ﬂows.
10On the contrary, poorer households in developing countries not only tend to have lower incomes,
but also more variable income and/or consumption streams (Morduch, 1994).
11This may be justiﬁed, for example, by assuming A to be a small open economy (i.e., which takes
the world interest rate as given), perfect competition, and constant returns to scale. As well known,
under such assumptions, the capital/labor ratio is ﬁxed, making the domestic return to labor (to
human capital) unaﬀected by migration.
6Hence, the variability of w is increasing in γ. Finally, to ensure that 1+γ² ≥ 0 for all
², we assume γ < 1.
Under this set of assumptions, the following results emerge.
First, it is immediate that domestic income variability (a positive γ)i san e c e s s a r y
condition for migration to be observed. This may be stated formally as follows:
Proposition 1: Assume some individuals are educated. Then some individuals
will migrate from A to B for certain outcomes of ² if and only if γ > 0.
Proof : An educated individual who remains in A has a second-period income
equal to (1 + γ²)ae, w h e r e a si fh em i g r a t e st oB his second-period income is kae.
Thus, migration will take place if and only if:
1+γ²<k (2.1)
for some ² and k. Since k ≤ 1, condition (2.1) implies that γ² must be negative; since
γ ≥ 0, this can only occur if γ > 0 (and ²<0).¥
It is straightforward to see from (2.1) that an educated individual would migrate
if and only if:




Therefore, ²∗(k) is the minimal value of ² for which an educated individual with a
given k will not migrate. Since, by assumption, ² ≥− 1, migration would occur only
if ²∗(k) > −1, i.e., if γ + k>1. Also, since k ≤ 1,² ∗(k) ≤ 0 for all k, implying that
no one from A migrates if the realized value of ² is non-negative. It also follows from
the above discussion that the probability, π(k), that an educated individual would
migrate is strictly positive if k>1−γ. Also, since individuals never migrate if ² ≥ 0,
it follows that π(k) is less than one-half. Thus, if γ > 0, 1
2 > π(k) > 0 for all educated
individuals for whom γ + k>1.
Second, it is clear that the migration probability for an educated individual can
never decrease (and generally increases) in response to higher domestic variability.
This is due to the fact that in order to make migration worthwhile, the domestic
return must be suﬃciently below its mean (unity), so as to outweigh the fact that a
dollar in B is only worth k to the migrant. For a small γ this is relatively unlikely.
As γ increases, however, the weight attached to negative realization of ² is greater,
thereby increasing the probability of migration. Moreover, if k =1 , all negative
realizations of ² imply migration, the probability of migration is 1
2, and is unaﬀected
by γ. This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Assume some individuals are educated. T h e n ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
variability of the domestic return to education raises the probability, π(k), that an
educated individual with k<1 would migrate, and leaves π(k) unchanged and equal
to 1
















and this is positive for k<1. If k =1 , ²∗ =0 , and, thus,
∂²∗(k)
∂γ =0 . ¥
As stated in Proposition 2, increased variability in the domestic return to education
generally raises the probability that an educated individual would migrate.
Consider now the relation between the variability of the domestic return to human
capital and the decision to invest in education. If the realization of ² is such that
²<² ∗(k), educated individuals would migrate to B and their lifetime income would
be −α+ka.I f ,h o w e v e r ,² ≥ ²∗(k), they would remains in A and their lifetime income
would be −α+(1+γ²)a. Thus, the expected lifetime income of an educated individual
is given by:







(1 + γ²)af(²)d² (2.2)
Using (2.2), a series of results may be derived regarding the pre-migration and
(expected) post-migration proportions of the educated among the population. Here-
after, we investigate the impact of the education cost, α, and the volatility parameter,
γ, on the number of individuals acquiring education (Propositions 3 to 6) and on the
expected proportion of educated in the remaining population (Propositions 7 to 9).
Proposition 3: If α =0 , all individuals (other than those with a =0 )would
invest in education.






(1 + γ²)af(²)d² ≥
Z 1
−1
(1 + γ²)af(²)d² = a.
¥
Clearly, if the cost of education is zero, anyone with a strictly positive ability, a,
would beneﬁt from investing in education.
Proposition 4: If α =1 , investment in education will occur if and only if γ > 0.
Proof: From (2.2) a necessary and suﬃcient condition for some individuals to















γ + k ≤ 1
¾
8Thus, γ +k ≤ 1 implies that V (a,k)=−α+a, and γ +k>1 implies that V (a,k) >
−α + a. Hence, if α =1and γ + k ≤ 1,V(a,k)=a − 1 ≤ 0. Thus, if α =1and
γ =0 , implying that γ + k ≤ 1, even individuals with the highest ability level (i.e.,
for which a =1 ) , and, therefore, all individuals with lesser ability, do not invest in
education. Conversely, if γ > 0, then, since k =1for some individuals, γ + k>1 for
some individuals, so that V (a,k) >a− 1. This implies that V (1,k) > 0. Hence, if
γ > 0 and α =1 , some individuals invest in education.¥
Proposition 5: If γ > 0, then, regardless of the value of α, there will always be
some individuals who invest in education.
Proof: This follows immediately from Proposition 4, because the beneﬁt derived
from investing in education rises as α declines.¥
Proposition 4 informs us that even if the cost of education is greater or equal
t ot h er e t u r nt oe d u c a t i o ni ne i t h e rA or B some individuals will nonetheless invest
in education if γ > 0. To understand why this is the case, note that by allowing
individuals to migrate, education enables them to determine whether they earn k or
1+γ² once the value of ² is known. This means that the individual’s second-period
income is amax(k,1+γ²), i.e., he has the option of selling his human capital for k if the
domestic wage is below k, and for 1+γ² if it exceeds k. Clearly, amax(k,1+γ²) >a
providing that migration is a possibility, i.e. γ + k>1, a condition that is always
satisﬁed for a suﬃciently large k if γ > 0, and is never satisﬁed if γ =0 .Thus, even
if α =1 , individuals with a suﬃciently high ability level, and certainly those with
a =1 , invest in education. Proposition 5 then simply generalizes Proposition 4.
Income variability, therefore, is a suﬃcient condition for investments in education
to be observed. More importantly, the number of educated individuals can be shown
to be increasing with the variability of the domestic rate of return to education:
Proposition 6: The number of individuals in A investing in education is an
increasing function of γ.
Proof :A s s u m eag i v e nk.L e ta∗ be the value of a which solves for V (a,k)=0 .
Thus, a∗(k) is the minimum level of ability at which an individual would invest in





































−1 ²f(²)d² =0 . Thus, for
ag i v e nk, the proportion of individuals investing in education increases with γ. It
follows immediately that this holds true for the population as a whole.¥
The higher the volatility parameter γ, the greater the number of A’s residents
investing in education. However, unfortunately, higher volatility also brings about
more expected migration from A to B. What then is the net impact of γ on the
educational proﬁle of the residents of A after migration has been netted out? If
γ =0 , only individuals with ability exceeding α would invest in education. In this
case, the number of educated individuals in A would be, therefore,
R 1
α g(a)da. By
contrast, if γ > 0, the actual migration is a random variable, since it depends on the
realization of ². We therefore have to work with expected values. Our interest is in the
diﬀerence between the expected number of educated individuals in A after migration
has been netted out, δ ≡ ρ(1−π), and
R 1
α g(a)da, the proportion of the educated in the
population when there is no volatility (and, consequently, no migration). Denoting




the following results obtain:
Proposition 7: For α =1 , ∆ > 0, i.e., the number of educated individuals in A
after migration has been netted out is greater for γ > 0 than for γ =0 .
Proof :I fα =1then
R 1
α g(a)da =0⇒ ∆ = ρ(1 − π). But, from Proposition 5,
γ > 0, implies that ρ > 0. In addition, as shown above, π generally lies between 0 and
1/2. Hence ∆ > 0.¥
Proposition 8: For α =0 , ∆ < 0, i.e., the number of educated individuals in A
after migration has been netted out is smaller for γ > 0 than for γ =0 .
Proof: If α =0 , then
R 1
α g(a)da =1 , implying that all individuals invest in
education (see Proposition 3). However, since π(k) generally lies between 0 and 1/2,
ρ(1 − π) < 1, so that ∆ < 0.¥
Proposition 9: If abilities are uniformly distributed, then, for individuals for
whom γ+k>1, a value of α exists, denoted by α∗(k), such that ∆ < 0 for α < α∗(k)
and ∆ > 0 for α > α∗(k).




















where 1 > β > 0. Thus,
∂∆
∂α
= −(1 − π)βg(a∗(k)) + g(α).
As u ﬃcient condition for ∂∆
∂α > 0 is that g(a∗(k)) ≤ g(α). This, of course, is always
valid for the uniform distribution, and may be valid for other distributions.
Combining the facts that ∂∆
∂α > 0 if g(a) is a uniform distribution with ∆(α =
1) > 0 (Proposition 7) and ∆(α =0 )< 0 (Proposition 8) concludes the proof.¥
The last three results can be interpreted as follows. As mentioned above, in-
come variability increases the number of educated individuals and, simultaneously,
the number of potential migrants. The ﬁrst eﬀect, which manifests ex-ante (in the
ﬁrst period), may be referred to as the ”option value eﬀect”, while the second eﬀect,
which is potential and materializes only in bad economic (second) periods, may be
referred to as a ”brain drain eﬀect”. The total eﬀect of income variability on the
proportion of educated in the population is, therefore, ambiguous, and depends on
which eﬀect dominates. As the cost of education, α, increases, the option value eﬀect
becomes increasingly important so that, for a suﬃciently high α (and certainly for
α =1 ) , the option eﬀect dominates. Thus, a large α (and certainly α =1 )implies
that the impact of domestic return variability is to increase the expected equilibrium
average number of educated individuals in A.
U n t i ln o w ,w eh a v ec o n s i d e r e dt h ee ﬀects of economy-wide shocks on the education
and migration decisions of its residents. This was done assuming that such instability
aﬀects the country’s population uniformly. However, this need not be the case. It may
well be that within a particular country, some regions or groups experience greater
income variability. In particular, this is likely for discriminated-against minorities,
who more often than not experience ampliﬁed (macro-generated) income variability.
The next section explores this issue.
3. Minorities and Migration
Minority groups often represent a substantial proportion of the immigrants from de-
veloping countries, and tend to be better educated than majority members. This is
quite remarkable, since such groups often face discrimination in the form of restricted
access to public education (e.g., through reduced quantity or quality of infrastructures,
restricted access to ﬁnancing, etc.). The phenomenon is hard to assess empirically,
since most receiving countries generally ignore the educational attainments and, with
almost no exceptions, the religion or ethnic origin of their immigrants. An excep-
tion, however, is given by the recent Australian data on immigrants from Malaysia,
Sri Lanka, and Fiji, three countries that are ethnically divided and have minorities
11subject to discrimination. The data show that minority members indeed tend to
be signiﬁcantly better educated than majority members, and represent a proportion
of the immigrants that is signiﬁcantly higher than their relative size in the origin
country.12 The same conclusions arise from many country monographs focusing on
intergroup diﬀerences in education and (international and internal) migration pat-
terns. For example, in his study on labor migration in Asia, Martin (1991, p. 187)
notes that ”Malaysians of Chinese origin appear the most likely to emigrate”, while
the high educational record of this group is well documented (e.g., Sudha, 1997, John-
son and DaVanzo, 1998). In the same vein, Gani and Ward’s (1995) study on the
migration of skilled workers from Fiji to New-Zealand illustrates how education pro-
vides its owners with an option to emigrate, an opportunity that has materialized for
the Indian minority in the face of Fiji’s recent political turmoil. In their research on
the sources of ethnic inequality in Vietnam, van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001)
also found substantial returns to migration for the educated members of the rural
minorities. Last, in their study of the determinants of female rural-urban migration
in eight African countries, Brockeroﬀ and Eu (1993, p. 573) conﬁrm that migration
probabilities increase with education and note quite incidentally that ”in no country
are women from the largest ethnic group more likely than others to migrate from
rural areas”.
Starting with Kuznets (1960), economic historians have been interested in the ef-
fects of ethnic discrimination on the human capital decisions of discriminated-against
groups. The theory of human capital suggests that minority members are likely to
be more educated than members of the majority when human capital provides a
means of avoiding discrimination (Brenner and Kiefer, 1981). For example, discrim-
ination against minorities has often taken the form of physical expulsion, implying
that minorities tend to invest in mobile assets (human capital) rather than physi-
cal ones (real estate, factories). As noted by Brenner and Kiefer (1981: 518), “a
discriminated-against group which has had physical capital conﬁscated in the past
might tend to take the probability of conﬁscation of an asset into consideration when
making an investment. Further, a group which had been compelled to emigrate from
a country might take the portability of an asset into consideration when making an
investment in a new country, especially if it continues to face discriminations”. Sim-
ilarly, labor market discrimination may cause minority members to gravitate toward
self-employment, which is often associated with a higher level of education (physicians,
lawyers etc.).
Our main concern, however, is not with the direct eﬀects of discrimination on ed-
ucation decisions, but with the additional indirect eﬀects of discrimination on educa-
tion via income variability. Political studies on ethnic conﬂicts in developing countries
emphasize that hard economic times tend to exacerbate ethnic tensions (Gurr, 1993,
Horowitz, 1998), placing a substantial number of minority groups in a vulnerable posi-
tion (or ”at risk”, as Gurr (1993) put it).13 In other words, the degree of hostility faced
12For more details on the Australian data, see Tremblay (2000).
13Among the 230 ”minorities at risk” listed by Gurr (1993), 72 groups were located in Africa
(representing 41% of the continent’s population) and 49 in Asia (12% of the population).
12by minority groups is likely to depend on the country’s general economic situation.
For example, sporadic anti-minority riots are known to be directed against middle-
man minorities, which often serve as a scapegoat for domestic diﬃculties (Cooter and
Landa, 1984; Samarasinghe and Coughlan, 1991).14 To the extent that labor and
product markets are facets of such tensions, this implies that minorities will generally
face higher income variability than members of the majority. Moreover, ethnic (or
religious, linguistic, regional, etc.) discrimination is often initiated at governmental
level and used for countercyclical redistributive purposes. Examples of such ”poli-
cies” include privileged access to public jobs and loans, ethnically biased tax systems,
and sometimes public harassment and organized violence against minorities.15 In
addition, discrimination against members of minorities, whatever its source, is likely
to cause them to engage in less asset diversiﬁcation (i.e. to concentrate on human
capital) as well as face the greater uncertainties associated with self-employment. All
this will further increase the variability of minority incomes.
In view of these considerations, minority members are likely to face greater income
variability than the rest of the population. To capture these eﬀects and to determine
their implications, let the variability of the domestic return to human capital for the
majority group be smaller than the variability of the return to human capital for
members of the minority. Denote the returns to human capital for majority members
by w1 =1+ γ1² and for minority members by w2 =1+γ2² where γ2 ≥ γ1.16
This implies that educated minority members would migrate if 1+γ2²<kwhereas
educated majority members would migrate if 1+γ1²<k . Thus, for a given k,
a member of the majority would migrate if ²<² ∗
1 = −1−k
γ1 and a member of the
minority would migrate if ²<² ∗
2 = −1−k
γ2 . The probability, π2 =
R ²∗
2
−1 f(²)d², that an




−1 f(²)d², that an educated majority member would do so.
One implication of the above is that members of a minority will often be viewed
as less loyal to the home country than members of the majority. Remember that the
value of k measures the relative utility of consumption at home and abroad. Clearly,
an individual with a high k does not put a high premium on domestic consumption.
In this sense, he or she might be viewed as ‘less loyal’ than someone with a lower k.
However, even if k is identically distributed among minority and majority members,
the number of educated minority members leaving the home country in bad times
would be disproportionately large. This fact may be (incorrectly) used to surmise
that members of the minority are less patriotic or loyal to the home country.
Moreover, since, as per Proposition 6,
∂ρ
∂γ > 0, the proportion of minority members
14The term ”middleman minorities” characterizes groups that are both intermediate in terms
of socio-economic status and caught in social conﬂicts between other groups (e.g., producers and
consumers, employers and employees, struggle for power between two major competing groups, etc.).
15See Bardhan (1997) for a political economy approach to such conﬂicts.
16To enable us to focus on return variability, it is assumed that the average returns to human
capital for minority and majority members are equal.
13who are educated will exceed that of the majority. Since only the educated migrate,
the high proportion of educated minority members implies an even greater migration
by minority members in bad times, thus reinforcing the view that minority groups are
less loyal than members of the majority. Conversely, since they are on average better
educated than members of the majority, members of the minority will have a higher
income per ability level if they remain in the home country. A higher variability in
the domestic return to education may therefore go part of the way towards explaining
the ubiquitous nationalist claim that minority members are both less loyal and unde-
servedly richer than members of the majority.17 In our model, ethnic discrimination
and conﬂict may thus cause minority groups to end up with increased emigration,
while non-migrating members of the minority may be richer than members of the ma-
jority with similar labor market characteristics.18 In both cases, hostility is likely to
develop, thus reinforcing any initial intergroup diﬀerences in income variability. This
in addition to similar (but diﬀerently motivated) eﬀects discussed in earlier work.
The following Table summarizes these results, where Λ relates to the sign of the
diﬀerence between majority and minority members. Recall that ρi gives the propor-
tion of the educated in group i,a n dπi is the probability that an educated individual
from group i would migrate. and Therefore, ρiπi is the expected proportion of mi-
grants from group i.A si sa p p a r e n tf r o mt h eT a b l eb e l o w ,yi is the average income



































2(1 + γ2²)af(²)d²g(a)da < 0
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a model of investment in education where the domestic
return to human capital is uncertain and migration is a possibility.
Our rationale may be summarized as follows. Education buys a person the ability
to migrate in response to higher incomes oﬀered elsewhere. In the face of a variable
domestic return to education and a ﬁxed foreign return to education, this implies
that education constitutes a put option: if the realization of the domestic return is
17It should be noted, however, that this last result may be attributed to the fact that the only
investment channel in our model is human capital, and we assumed no liquidity constraints. The
result that minority groups do better than majority groups in good times would be modiﬁed and may
even be reversed once non-human capital and/or diﬀerential acces to credit markets are introduced.
18Since such features may well induce further hostile attitudes towards the minority, an interesting
extension for future research would be to analyze the dynamics at work behind ethnic hostility and
conﬂicts.
14low, the educated individual can sell his education at a pre-determined private return
abroad. As is well known, the value of an option is increasing in the variability
of the underlying asset. Thus, the value of education is an increasing function of
the variability of the domestic return to education. This result does not, in any
way, depend on risk aversion. This implies that the domestic demand for education
is an increasing function of the variability of the domestic return to education. In
addition, such variability has an eﬀect on the amount of migration done. The greater
the variability, the higher the proportion of domestic return realizations for which
educated individuals migrate. Thus, an increase in the variability of the domestic
return to education has two eﬀects: it increases the amount of education bought
domestically, as well as the amount of migration done. The main result of the analysis
is that in a developing economy open to emigration, the expected (post-migratory)
level of education may well increase with the variability of the domestic return to
human capital if education is suﬃciently costly. This suggests that the possibility of
migration may enhance human capital formation even if the mean return to human
capital is equalized internationally.
We then applied the model to the issue of discriminated-against minorities, who
face higher levels of income volatility as a result of ethnic discrimination and conﬂicts.
According to the predictions of our model, this implies that minority members may
be better educated and apparently less patriotic (migrate in higher proportion) than
members of the majority. These implications, illustrated by extensive evidence from
LDCs, have been shown to complement the direct eﬀects of discrimination previously
highlighted in the human capital literature.
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